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mAbstract
Mitochondrial donation poses the latest regulatory challenge for policy-makers in the
context of assisted conception. Since 2010 the Human Genetics Commission, the
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority and the Nuffield Council on Bioethics
have all considered the policy implications of permitting use of these techniques in
treatment. The Nuffield Council on Bioethics reported its recommendations in June
2012 following a consultation on the ethical issues raised by these techniques; and a
separate consultation by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority in
conjunction with Sciencewise-ERC followed in September 2012. Matters for
consideration included the potential relationships created by the use of three parties’
genetic material and the associated ramifications, eg whether or not there is a need
to establish records of such donations and, if so, to whom should information later
be provided? Thus, mitochondrial donation poses both novel and familiar questions
about the ‘genetic family’, ‘parentage’ and ‘identity’. This article explores some of the
ways in which mitochondrial DNA is constructed as relatively (in) significant in recent
Parliamentary debates, policy and consultation documents. It reflects on the ways in
which the role of some genetic connections, or lack thereof, are mediated in law
and policy.Introduction
The development of mitochondrial donation or replacement techniques poses the
latest regulatory challenge for policy-makers in the context of assisted conception.
Since 2010 three key UK policy-advisors/makers, notably the Human Genetics
Commission (2010), HFEA (2011) and the Nuffield Council on Bioethics (2012a)
have considered the policy implications of permitting the use of these techniques
in treatment cycles. The NCOB reported its findings on June 12, 2012 (Nuffield
Council on Bioethics 2012b) and the HFEA, together with Sciencewise-ERC
(http://www.sciencewise-erc.org.uk/), launched its public consultation on the
ethical issues raised by these techniques in September 2012a. We use the phrase
‘mitochondrial donation’ throughout, as adopted by the NCOB, but note that the
HFEA utilised the term ‘mitochondrial replacement’ in its 2012 consultation and
associated documentation. Similarly, we refer to ‘mutated’, ‘faulty’ and ‘unhealthy’
mitochondria in the discussion below as these are commonly used terms in the lit-
erature, rather than us seeking to make a ‘judgement’ about the biological2013 Jones and Holme; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
ttribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
edium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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tions regarding such terminology falls outside the scope of this paper).
Among the numerous ethical and legal questions raised by mitochondrial dona-
tion is the broader consideration of the (im)permissibility of ‘germline therapies’
per se, and whether or not they should be treated as a useful test case for ethical
issues involved in future potential nuclear DNA/germline modificationb. Within
this context, both familiar and novel questions about the ‘genetic family’, ‘parentage’
and ‘identity’ can be found. The focus of this paper is the examination of some of
the ways in which mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) is constructed as relatively (in)
significant in recent Parliamentary debates, policy and consultation documents, in
order to reflect on the ways in which the role of genetic connections are mediated
in policy formation. The paper explores both ‘parentage’ & ‘identity', and reflects
on the framing of the debates, in order to consider whether there is anything novel
about mitochondrial donation that causes the current paradigm(s) of understanding
(in Anglo-Welsh law and policy) to fall apart.
Prior to embarking on the main body of the paper it is useful to pause briefly to
consider why techniques of mitochondrial donation were developed, and what each
method entails.Biology 101
Mitochondria are present in almost all cells in the human body (red blood cells
are an exception), and produce the energy the body needs to function. Mitochon-
dria contain a small amount of DNA (mtDNA), usually only inherited matrilineally
through the mother’s eggs (Schwartz & Vissing 2002). To give a sense of scale,
mtDNA accounts for an estimated 0.1% of our DNA, and has 37 genes thought to
govern mitochondrial function, 13 of which code for proteins; whereas nuclear
DNA makes up an estimated 99.9% of our DNA, with circa 25,000 genesc. How-
ever, cells have a population of mitochondria and, depending on the cell type/func-
tion, may contain a few hundred or several thousand. Whilst many people have
low levels of mutated mitochondria in their cells, with little or no difficulties ensu-
ing, those with higher levels can have serious health issues. Inherited mitochondrial
disorders have – at present – no known cures, and may have seriously disabling
symptoms, with the potential to cause death in babies and young persons (although
the severity of symptoms and prognosis inevitably varies between people). While
some mitochondrial diseases are caused by mutations in nuclear DNA (nDNA) ra-
ther than in mtDNA, the current techniques - and therefore the policy develop-
ments in this area - are focused solely on the avoidance of the transmission of
mutated mtDNA per se. Consideration of nDNA modification to ameliorate or pre-
vent mitochondrial conditions accordingly falls outside the focus of this paper.
Currently, women who wish to have children and avoid passing on mtDNA condi-
tions have few options. They can seek to use donated eggs, provided by a woman
without a history of mitochondrial condition(s); apply for adoption, or seek an ar-
rangement with a surrogate mother willing to use her own eggs or donated eggs. In
order to reduce the risk of transmission, women can elect to have preimplantation
genetic diagnosis (PGD) to estimate the levels of mutated mitochondria in a given
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which – when severe – have fatal outcomes, as the levels of mutated mitochondria in
early embryos are a poor predictor of the severity of the disorder. Nor can PGD
predict if the embryo will develop into an individual with a high level of mutated
mitochondria in all their tissue types, or only in some or one. Hence, PGD is not
suitable for all women, including those with high levels of mutated mitochondria;
leaving aside any issues pertaining to accessing these technologies. Finally, prenatal
diagnosis (PND) can be utilised, but in addition to the limitations outlined above
regarding PGD, women (and partners) may be faced with deciding whether or not to
terminate their pregnancies, a (potentially) difficult decision exacerbated by the
uncertainty in predicting mitochondrial conditions and their severity. Hence, the use
of mitochondrial donation techniques would enable these women to have a
genetically related child (through their nDNA), if they so wished, whilst simultan-
eously avoiding the possibility of transmission of ‘faulty’ mtDNA to future
generations.Mitochondrial donation techniques and the policy timeline
Two techniques have emerged, ‘pronuclear transfer’ and ‘maternal spindle transfer’.
Both would create children born with nDNA from their parents’ sperm and eggd
plus healthy mitochondria from an egg donor, unrelated to the mother; hence, giv-
ing rise to a child with genetic connections to three people. The HFEA and NCOB
have provided accessible explanations and diagrams of both methods which we will
not repeat heree. The key distinction is that pronuclear transfer (PNT) involves the
creation and use of embryos, or more accurately 1 day old zygotes (one of which
is discarded), whereas maternal spindle transfer (MST) uses eggs (one of which is
discarded). Hence there are at least three, and potentially four individuals providing
gametes in each cycle, depending on which technique is used.
Both methods are currently being developed under a research licence, granted by
the HFEA, but are not yet lawful for use in treatment cyclesf. The Newcastle
University group leading this research was initially granted a licence in 2005g and
some success regarding PNT was reported in 2008h, resulting in calls for the
HFEA to be permitted to licence this technique for treatment in humansi. Around
this time the first ‘three-parent baby’ media headlines emergedj (see below). Ultim-
ately, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 (HFE Act 2008) amended
the 1990 Act of the same name – resulting in the insertion of 3ZA(5) HFE Act
1990k. This section enables the Secretary of State to introduce Regulations to Par-
liament in the future that (subject to Parliament’s approval) would permit the use
of eggs or embryos that have undergone techniques such as PNT or MST in treat-
ment cycles for people seeking to avoid the transmission of ‘serious mitochondrial
disease’l. In preparation for placing such Regulations before Parliament, in January
2011 the then Secretary of State for Health, Andrew Lansley, invited the HFEA to
report on the ‘safety and efficacy’ of these techniquesm and in 2012, in conjunction
with the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, he invited the
HFEA and Sciencewise-ERC to undertake public dialogue on these developments
(www.hfea.gov.uk/6896.html). As outlined above, for our purposes in this paper,
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framing of potential implications for the child’s identity.Parentage: two, three or ‘fractional’?
For our purposes ‘parentage’ is taken to mean genetic parentsn leading to the
question as to whether having genetic contributions from three distinct ‘providers’
has (or should have) any legal and/or social significance?o. References to ‘parents’
were evident in the relevant Parliamentary debates, with the polarity of views
highlighted by two examples: Lord Alton claimed that ‘adoption would be better than
creating three genetic parents’; whereas Lord Walton was clear that ‘the idea that the
resulting child has three parents is a nonsense’p. In many respects, therefore, this is
the familiar question about parentage and the (assumed) unity of meaning of the
terms ‘parent’, ‘mother’ and ‘father’ (potentially) disrupted by, for example, surrogacy
and donor conceptionq. But, is the addition of a third party’s mitochondria (and
hence mtDNA) sufficient to bring about a shift in legal policy?Media headlines
A brief look at some of the UK media headlines on mitochondrial donation in 2008
and 2011 might point in this direction. These examples illustrate the media’s
construction of the techniques in relation to ‘parents’ (emphasis added): A step towards three-parent babies? (Nature)r
 Three-parent embryo formed in lab. BBC News (2008)
 Three-parent babies a step closer after watchdog gives research go-ahead despite
‘life meddling’ fears. (Daily Mail) (Derbyshire 2011)
 ‘Three-parent’ IVF babies on their way. (New Scientist blog) (Hamzelou 2011)
 Three-parent IVF, and baby makes 4. … [technique] that creates children with one
father and two biological mothers. (Sunday Times)s
 Babies with THREE parents and free of genetic disease could soon be born using
controversial IVF technique. (Daily Mail)t
 Scientists seek to implant embryos with genetic material from three parents.
(The Guardian) (Boseley 2011)The Sunday Times highlighted the novel aspects thus: ‘the new technique would
for the first time involve a third person contributing genetically’; and went further,
‘raising the question of what rights, if any, such “fractional parents” would have in
relation to the child’?u. Clearly, classification as (some kind of ) ‘parent’ was the
media’s starting point for understanding the contribution of the mitochondrial
donor, with a need, in the latter example, to clarify their legal position per the child
(but no indication of any consideration of the child’s status in relation to the adult)v.
Interestingly, however, it is not the first time a third person could contribute
genetically through the use of ARTs, as cytoplasmic donation/ooplasmic transfer
attests (Robertson 1999); but this technique was not licensed in the UK and has since
been prohibited in some other jurisdictionsw, with no reported follow-up studiesx.
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drawn upon in order to inform the current policy challenges (favourably or
otherwise).
Policy constructions
In 2010 the HGC expressed concern regarding the media headlines:
Despite newspaper headlines describing the possibility of ‘children with three genetic
parents’ it is not clear that the donor of the mitochondria should in any way be
regarded as a progenitor (or a gamete donor for the purposes of the framework
legislation) any more than a kidney or bone marrow donor should be regarded as
progenitor of the recipient. … it might be decisive that the mitotchondria do not
participate in fertilisation, … [they] are replicated rather than procreated … down the
generations.y (emphasis added).
Similarly avoiding the loaded term ‘parent’, the HFEA’s Ethics and Law Advisory
Committeez asked the question of ‘how would the mitochondria provider be classified?’
(emphasis added), noting that some people may view the introduction of a third
person’s genetic material as less ‘novel’ due to their familiarity with bone marrow
transplantsaa. Finally, the NCOB, in its call for evidence, enquired in the following
language:
After the use of these techniques, children would inherit nuclear DNA (around
25,000 genes) from their parents, and mtDNA (13 genes) from the donor of the egg.
What might the use of these techniques signify for the relationships of the resulting
child to the three adults with whom it shares a genetic connection?The HFEA and the NCOB both raise the question as to the appropriate categorisa-
tion of the mitochondrial/egg donor, which we return to below under ‘practical
matters’. However, on the issue of one person having genetic contributions from three
parties, as highlighted by the HFEA re bone marrow transplants, the NCOB is clear
that whilst this does involve the incorporation of a third person’s genes into patients’
bodies, ‘these changes are not inherited by the patients’ children’bb and therefore may
be distinguishable. Not only would mitochondrial donation result in a permanent
modification of the child’s germline, but if female - given the matrilineal transmission
of mtDNA - she would pass on the ‘acquired’ mtDNA to her future offspring/
generationscc.Law
We are familiar with the separation of genetic and gestational motherhood following
IVF, egg donation and surrogacy; but would a separation into major and minor genetic
contributors create any difficulties regarding the legal constructions of mothers? This
seems very unlikely, given the primacy accorded to gestation in Anglo-Welsh Lawdd;
and while the HFE Act 2008 can countenance two female parents, it cannot
countenance two mothers – where two women are recognised together as legal parents
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patrilineally it would have been interesting to see if mitochondrial donation had any
impact on, for example, child support provisions, given the usual focus on paternal
genetic ties.
Other jurisdictions have been more open to recognising three legal parents. For ex-
ample, in 2005 the New Zealand Law Commissionff tabled the possibility of recognising
three legal parents where donor insemination was used; and in 2007 the Court of
Appeal in Ontario, Canada, made a declaration of parentage in favour of a lesbian co-
mother as the child’s third legal parent (where DI was used)gg. These instances illustrate
the flexibility that may be exercised in some jurisdictions, even where there were ‘only’
two genetic contributors but three persons involved in parenting the child. However, it
does not seem likely that the provision of mtDNA per se will disrupt the current
paradigm regarding ‘parentage’ in Anglo-Welsh Law. Despite this apparent clarity, and
as we have already noted, the matter of how mitochondrial donors are to be classified
does have tangible policy outcomes that must be addressed.Identity: ‘Just a tiny, tiny bit of DNA’hh
The second and related focal point is identity. One difficulty raised here is what is
meant by identity, a topic that would readily take up several other volumes. Political,
legal and ethical texts make various links between the concepts of identity and those of
“genes” or “genomes”, and as Christine Hauskeller (2004) has argued these are often
contradictory. With regard to mtDNA the current policy debates have constructed the
issue as one of its (non-)contribution to identity, demonstrates:
The Appeal Committee accepted that Mitochondrial (sic) DNA is not associated
with identity or any pre-determined characteristics of the individual. … [it] was
satisfied that where pronuclear material is deposited into a new cell this does not
change the genetic structure of the new cell because the nuclear material over-rides
(sic) any DNA in the mitochondrial DNA (HFEA 2005). (emphasis added)
Accordingly, the HFEA’s starting point was that mtDNA is not part of the genetic
structure, and therefore is not identity determining. However, Lenny Moss has argued
that there has been a conflation of two distinct historical types of concept, ‘gene P
(henotype)’ and ‘gene D(NA)', which leads to the popular idea of having genes for
characteristics (Moss 2003). This conceptualisation is evident in the HFEA’s language
above, which de-limits the role of mtDNA, but in doing so tends to suggest that there
are indeed ‘genes for’ characteristics (eg eye colourii ), which does not recognise the
complexity of genomics.
Subsequent policy documents have shown more nuanced approaches to the concept
of identity. For example, the HGC focused on the ‘philosophically complex’ concept of
‘personal identity’, warning against ‘crude geneticism’ based on percentage contribution,
and highlighting that ‘genetics is only one discourse’ relevant to an individual’s
identityjj. The NCOB simply asked “How might mitochondrial DNA be associated with
a person’s identity?” and raised questions as to the relationships created between the
people involved in these new techniqueskk; and in its subsequent Report considered
four different notions of identity, namely ‘self-conception’, ‘qualitative’, ‘numerical’ and
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levelled at its stance in 2005mm, and reflected briefly on some philosophical approaches
to personal identity (drawing on John Locke and John Searle)nn, before concluding that
‘the issue of personal identity is, and will probably remain, an unanswerable question.’
Limitations of space preclude further analysis of the rich discourse in these policy
documents, which merit further consideration elsewhere.
Nonetheless, the HFEA also highlighted that ‘the majority of scientific opinion suggests
that … [mtDNA] … would not affect a person’s essential characteristics (for example, a
person’s hair or eye colour)’ (emphasis added)oo. A further example is provided by one of
the key scientists and advisors to the HFEA, albeit in the context of rebutting the ‘three-
parent’ headlines, thus: ‘This is not, however, “three-parent IVF”, said Professor Robin
Lovell-Badge … “It is not a term we have used once in this report [HFEA Report, April
2011] and it is not a term that should be used,” he said. “This is a tiny, tiny bit of DNA. It
is not carrying any characteristics except that you have normally functioning
mitochondria”.’pp (emphasis added) Hence, the rebuttal focused on the ‘size’ of the
mtDNA, and once again on the types of characteristics. Whilst many scientists may be
certain that a person’s ‘essential characteristics’ will be unaffected by mitochondrial dona-
tion, it is far from clear that the media will portray these developments in quite the same
wayqq, or what lay understandings will emerge. One reason this is significant is if/when
these techniques are made lawful in the UK, in the future persons born following mito-
chondrial donation will have access to the media coverage. ‘Identity’ pertains not only to
how we see ourselves, but how others view us. Hence, worries regarding ‘life meddling’
fears’ in the Daily Mailrr are far from helpful, and also echo (potentially) damaging media
coverage of the development of ARTs - from the (early) typification of sperm donors as
‘criminal’ to the fascination with Louise Brown’s development and procreative capacity.
The final issue considered here is the extent to which mtDNA is ‘identifiable’. The
UK policy debates (outlined briefly above) have minimised the role which mtDNA can
potentially play with regard to identification. Yet, mtDNA is a validated technique for
the identification of skeletons in forensics (Wilson et al. 1995; Holland et al. 1993); and
also can be used in genealogy, with reference to ‘Mitochondrial Eve’ss. More controver-
sially it has been used for ‘ethnicity testing’ for children with unknown parentage enter-
ing the care system (Lucassen et al. 2010); and would have formed part of a proposed
DNA based project to be piloted by the UK Border Agency, the ‘Human Provenance
Pilot Project’, but this was dropped in March 2011. This project was reportedly driven
by a desire to determine if the person was of the nationality which they claimed (from,
for example, Somalia) or an economic migrant (from, for example, Kenya) – but the
scientific community was damning as to the conflation of mtDNA for ancestry with
that for race/nationality (Brumfiel 2011; Balding et al. 2010). However questions remain
as to whether different concepts of ‘identity’, and indeed alternative forms of state
regulation (of ‘identity’) are used, depending on whether one is a refugee, a child in the
care system, or conceived and born following mitochondrial donation.Practical matters
However, if for example mtDNA is constructed in policy as (potentially) significant to
one’s identity, or if mitochondrial donors are to be treated akin to or in precisely
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cations might this have? Would there, for example, be a legal obligation to place details
on the Register of Information with the HFEAtt regarding the mitochondrial donation,
and what type of information and to whom, if anyone, should it be made available to in
the future? The Joint Committee scrutinising the Draft Bill noted that the situation was
unclear:
We suspect that the Government’s intention in this respect is that the child should
have only two registered parents—those whose nuclear DNA was used to create the
embryo—but that the child should be able to discover the identity of the female donor
of mitochondrial DNA from the Register of Information in the same way as other
donor-conceived individuals. This is not entirely clear from the draft Bill and
Explanatory Notes, although the Department of Health did provide further
information on this point in a memorandum to the House of Lords Delegated
Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. This memorandum suggests that the
power in clause 34 might, for example, be used to clarify that the woman who
donated the egg with healthy mitochondria could not apply for a parental order on
the basis that she only contributed mitochondrial, not nuclear, DNA to the embryouu.
(emphasis added).
Hence, the Joint Committee indicated that the mitochondrial donor was unlikely to
be viewed as a legal parent on the basis of the provision of mtDNA alone; especially in
light of the (expected) prohibition on such women seeking a parental order following
surrogacy. However, the conditions determining eligibility for applying for parental or-
ders do not require both intending parents to have a ‘genetic’ connection to the child in
question, but instead specify only that the ‘gametes of at least one of the applicants’
were usedvv (Biggs and Jones 2013). On a literal interpretation, therefore, the mitochon-
drial donor would have provided her own ‘gametes’, and any Regulations placed before
Parliament for approval will need to be drafted clearly in order to delineate what
exactly is meant by ‘gametes’ in this context.
The classification of the mitochondrial donor is also bound up in the broader regula-
tory context alluded to by the Joint Committee, including the Register of Information.
To that end, Parliament inserted s.35A into the HFE Act 1990 to ensure that the per-
tinent provisions could be modified if mitochondrial donation is made lawful in the fu-
ture. In addition to those governing parental orders, these provisions relate to the
register of (donor) information (s.31 HFE Act 1990); the provision of information
(s.31ZA-E), including requests by donor-conceived people as to their genetic parentage
(s.31ZA); consents to the use or storage of gametes and embryos (Schedule 3); and the
information to be provided to prospective parents under the licence conditions, regard-
ing the early disclosure of the mode of their child’s (donor) conception (s.13(6C)). The
stipulation of these factors does not, however, indicate that mitochondrial donors will
necessarily be treated in the same way as egg donors. Rather, Parliament has simply en-
sured that the current regulatory framework has made provision for future clarification
of their status, should it be necessary.
As mentioned above (under ‘parentage’), the question of how mitochondrial donors
should be treated/classified has been raised by the HFEA and the NCOB. Both have
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donors or gamete donors; donors of other bodily materials (NCOB onlyww), or a new
‘middle ground’ classification providing ‘a unique set of rights and responsibilities’xx. If
mitochondrial donors are to be treated in the same way as ‘traditional’ egg donors then
the regulatory position is clear (Nuffield Council on Bioethics. 2012b), whereas classifi-
cation as tissue/organ donors would involve a demarcation between ‘egg’ donors and
‘mitochondrial’ donors. Nonetheless, there remains the possibility of a unique arrange-
ment emerging.
The NCOB has recommended that ‘“motherhood” is not indicated either biologically
or legally by virtue of mitochondrial donation’; accordingly the donor should not be
accorded the same status as a traditional egg donor. Hence, although they were clear
that the current fiscal arrangements and safety regulations for egg donors should also
operate for mitochondrial donors, the ‘10 family’ limit (for gamete donations) was con-
sidered overly cautious. The NCOB further stated that mitochondrial donors should
not be mandatorily identifiable in the future and that there was ‘no reason’ to establish
sibling registries (Nuffield Council on Bioethics. 2012b). Interestingly therefore, imme-
diately after these recommendations, the NCOB went on to suggest that a voluntary
system might be ‘set up and mediated by an appropriate central body’, to facilitate
contact between mitochondrial donors and offspring (Nuffield Council on Bioethics.
2012b). Yet no mention of such a system is made with regard to those sperm donors
(solely) involved in the creation of embryos used in PNT cycles (ie whose pronuclear
material will be discarded). Presumably this is due to the lack of any genetic tie with
those born following these techniques. However, when viewed through a ‘collaborative
reproduction’ lens, it is more difficult to demarcate with certainty who should/not be
included on such a register, not least as there is a dearth of research on this issue (Blyth
et al. 2012).Conclusion
In this paper we have considered some of the ways in which mitochondrial dona-
tion has been framed in recent policy debates and consultation documents, with
particular emphasis on ‘parentage’ and ‘identity’. One key consideration has been
whether there is anything so novel about mitochondrial donation that it calls into
question the current paradigms of understanding in Anglo-Welsh Law with regard
to ‘parentage’ and the construction of donors in this context (defined broadly so as
to include those providing gametes, organs, tissues, or other bodily materials).
While we have concluded that mitochondrial donation is unlikely to call into ques-
tion the current construction of legal parents (due to the primacy accorded to ges-
tation), the classification of women donating mitochondria is likely to pose some
problems for the policy-makers. Unlike most other types of donation, ie organyy,
tissue, blood and other bodily materials, mitochondrial donation not only alters the
recipients’ genetic germline, but – for female offspring who go on to have their own
children – this change is inter-generational. Hence, the direct analogies with the dona-
tion of tissue, blood, other bodily materials and organs (with the exception of ovaries),
breaks down. It is unclear, therefore, how these egg/mitochondrial donors will be classi-
fied when Regulations are (as we assume they will be) eventually placed before
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icy debates concerns ‘serious’ debilitating ‘metabolic’ conditionszz, there is some evi-
dence to link mitochondrial mutations with ageing and cancer(Kang et al. 2005;
Chinnery 2002); so future research in this field may also yield information pertaining
to broader health implications, which in turn may pose further regulatory
conundrums.Endnotes
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cit. note 5: 2.13.
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Bredenoord et al. Ooplasmic and nuclear transfer to prevent mitochondrial DNA
Jones and Holme Life Sciences, Society and Policy 2013, 9:4 Page 12 of 14
http://www.lsspjournal.com/content/9/1/4disorders: conceptual and normative issues. Human Reproduction Update 2008; 14:
669–678, 670.
yHGC. 2010. Discussion of ethical issues in human reproduction using material
containing DNA from more than two sources. HGC 10/P07 – Annex A: para 25,
available from www.hgc.gov.uk.
zHFEA. June 2011, ELAC (06/11) 1: 6.22, available from www.hfea.gov.uk/6896.html
(accessed 30 May 2012).
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bbNCOB, op. cit. note 4: 13.
ccThis led the NCOB to question whether it would be appropriate to use PGD and
sex-selection in order to select only male embryos for implantation, to avoid future
potential problems for subsequent generations, see NCOB, op. cit. note 4: 11–14.
ddSee s.33(1) HFE Act 2008: ‘The woman who is carrying or has carried a child as a
result of the placing in her of an embryo or of sperm and eggs, and no other woman, is
to be treated as the mother of the child.’ In addition, s.47 HFE Act 2008 makes clear
that a woman cannot be considered to be the parent of a child simply by the fact of
egg donation. Under the common law, see Lord Simon of Glaisdale’s statement that
“[m]otherhood, although also a legal relationship, is based on a fact, being proved
demonstrably by parturition”, in The Ampthill Peerage Case [1977] AC 547, 577.
eeJones, 2011, op. cit. note 25: 210–212. See also Diduck, op. cit. note 25;
McCandless, J. and Sheldon, S. The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act (2008)
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kkNCOB, op. cit. note 4: 10–11.
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